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DaviD R. HenDeRson1
a RejoinDeR to: Benjamin alamaR and stanton glantz, “smoking in Restau-
Rants: a Reply to HendeRson,” Econ Journal Watch 4(3), septemBeR 2007: 
292-295. link.
aBstRact
in tHeiR last paRagRapH, alamaR anD glantz (2007) wRite, “Hen-
derson (2007) does not accurately identify any problems either theoretically or 
statistically with our analysis.” This is an amazing conclusion, given that I did 
identify theoretical and statistical problems with their analysis. I will respond to 
the specifics, but I invite the reader to read my article and their reply together. 
Alamar and Glantz (2007) have largely chosen to ignore my criticism. I close with 
a challenge to Alamar and Glantz.
economic tHeoRy
A quick recounting of our theoretical differences, up to but not including 
their response, is in order. Alamar and Glantz (2004) assert that smoking in restau-
rants imposes externalities. They argue that the large number of customers “with 
greatly varied preferences” with regard to smoking causes negotiation costs to be 
high. This, they argue, “violates the assumption of low costs in the Coase theorem” 
and, they conclude, makes smoking an externality that is not internalized.
My criticism (Henderson 2007) is that restaurant owners do not have to 
negotiate with customers. All they need do, whether the issue is smoking, dress-
code policy, music, or menu choices, is make their decision and see how successful 
1 Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, CA 93943.
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they are. Customers who want to eat in a non-smoking restaurant can do so; cus-
tomers who want to eat in a smoking restaurant can do so; customers who want to 
eat in a restaurant that allows smoking in a designated area can do so. Customers 
show their values of these various options by the prices they are willing to pay 
and by the frequency of their patronage. Restaurant owners have an unbiased 
incentive to trade off the values put on smoking by various potential patrons and, 
therefore, do not reach a biased result in favor of allowing smoking. Introducing 
the desires of restaurant employees complicates the analysis without changing the 
bottom line: restaurant owners have an incentive, via wages paid and workmen’s 
compensation, to take account of the desires of the employees also.
In their reply, Alamar and Glantz write:
It is not possible for a restaurant owner to internalize the cost of 
second-hand smoke on the health of the staff or patrons. There is 
no mechanism by which a restaurant owner can compensate a pa-
tron for any health costs related to second-hand smoke, therefore 
it is not possible for the owner to have completely internalized the 
costs of the externality imposed by the smoker. (292)
Alamar and Glantz have completely missed my point. My argument is that 
not only is it possible for restaurant owners to internalize the cost, but also that 
that is what they do. There is no need for a “mechanism” to compensate a patron. 
Instead, the patron decides on the negative value he or she puts on a restaurant 
that has smoke and that negative value is reflected in what he or she is willing to 
pay for the restaurant experience. In that way, the putative externality is internal-
ized. That is why I said that they beg the question: they start with the assumption 
that smoking in a restaurant imposes externalities rather than establishing that it 
does. It is not surprising that if one assumes that there is an externality, one will 
be driven to the conclusion that there is an externality. Interestingly, Alamar and 
Glantz (2007) avoided responding to my analogy between smoking policy and T-
shirt policy. Yet all their reasoning, if correct, can be applied to T-shirt policy. 
In deciding whether to buy, consumers come to the experience. If, follow-
ing Alamar and Glantz’s logic, smoke in restaurants is to be called an externality, 
then people who don’t like some dimensions of experiences they came to would 
also suffer an externality. Customers at sports clubs who don’t like the boister-
ous cheering would be suffering an externality. Patrons at the movie theater who 
don’t like having to sit up so as to peer above the people seated in front of them 
would suffer an externality. People at Disney World who don’t like having to wait 
in lines would suffer an externality. Alamar’s and Glantz’s definition of “external-
ity” is too broad. It ignores the most basic characteristic of the idea: effects on 
parties who are external to the decisions that make for those effects. If you decide 
to go a restaurant, sit down, and buy a meal, you are not external to the ordinary 
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and expected features of experience you find in the restaurant. 
Finally, Alamar and Glantz (2007) state, “Henderson (2007) claims that we 
do not put enough faith in these entrepreneurs’ views,” namely the view that if 
consumers value it highly enough, some entrepreneurs will gain from a smoke-
free environment. But I said nothing about faith. Rather, I believe that entre-
preneurs often experiment and that some entrepreneurial restaurant owners will 
experiment with a ban on smoking. Then if banning smoking is as good for the 
bottom line as Alamar and Glantz claim, they will stick with the ban. When 
other restaurant owners observe the results, then they too will be more inclined 
to ban smoking—if, that is, Alamar and Glantz are right about the profitability 
of instituting bans on smoking. This is the standard story about what happens 
in competitive markets. Where is the “faith” in this story? Indeed, it is Alamar 
and Glantz (2007) who have faith, in two ways. First, they assert, “When these 
entrepreneurs only have the biased information given to them from the tobacco 
industry (without being told that it is coming from the tobacco industry (Alamar 
and Glantz 2004)) how are they to know that the information is biased?” Um, 
maybe by getting other information? Alamar and Glantz have complete faith that 
the tobacco industry has been such a powerful persuader that they have made all 
restaurant owners completely uncurious. This view that the restaurant owners 
have considered no other information is a strange view and one for which they 
give zero evidence.
There’s another group in which Alamar and Glantz seem to have faith: 
voters. Basic public choice analysis has explored how enlightenment depends on 
incentives to overcome the costs and biases of ignorance, and on the complexity 
of the issues considered. Alamar and Glantz turn these teachings on their head. 
They show remarkably little confidence in the self-regarding wisdom of restaurant 
owners who have a huge amount at stake, and yet they have great confidence in 
the wisdom of voters, most of whom individually have little at stake. The exter-
nality from smoking, Alamar and Glantz argue, “is one reason that the public has 
demanded laws to make restaurants smokefree.” 
Yet, compared to restaurant owners, voters have much less incentive to 
become more enlightened in the matter, and the political issue they face as voters 
is vastly more complex than the decision a restaurant owner faces concerning his 
own particular business and his own customers. Somehow Alamar and Glantz 
overlook such elementary analysis.
There are better explanations for the fact that voters sometimes support smok-
ing bans. One is that a non-smoking majority simply doesn’t care about the effect 
that smoking bans have on restaurant owners and diners who would like to smoke. 
Another is that the typical voter who supports bans foolishly thinks that banning 
smoking is morally and socially right, and he doesn’t overcome that foolishness, 
because, even if only implicitly, he knows his vote will not affect outcomes.
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tHe empiRical eviDence
In Henderson (2007), I made three main criticisms of the empirical evi-
dence in Alamar and Glantz (2004). Alamar and Glantz (2007) respond to only 
one of the criticisms. Again, I shall recount the debate quickly. 
The statistical evidence in Alamar and Glantz (2004) was that in a cross-
sectional study of restaurants, those restaurants in areas that banned smoking had 
a higher Price to Sales ratio (P/S) than those restaurants in areas that did not ban 
smoking. P here is the price at which a restaurant is sold and S is the annual sales 
revenue of the restaurant. From this finding, and this finding alone, Alamar and 
Glantz (2004) concluded that bans on smoking make restaurants more profitable.
My criticisms were three and I shall consider them in turn. First, the P/S 
ratio tells us nothing about the magnitude of P. I pointed out that if P/S is higher 
in areas with bans on smoking, this could be because P actually fell but S fell even 
more. This is the criticism to which Alamar and Glantz (2007) respond. They 
admit the mathematical point. But they cite literature showing that in fact S (sales) 
did not decline after a smoking ban had passed. If that were all there is to say on 
the issue, Alamar and Glantz (2007) would have made a good argument.
But that is not all there is to it. In citing the literature on sales, Alamar 
and Glantz (2007) say something interesting and revealing. They write that the 
literature cited included “all data points both pre and post implementation of a 
smokefree law.” Their statement is consistent with one of my other criticisms 
of their original article. I had pointed out that in the areas where the ban was 
implemented, the restrictions may have wiped out some restaurants, making the 
remaining restaurants more profitable. Studies that consider the data on restau-
rants before and after a ban will miss the negative effect on restaurants that are 
eliminated; one cannot study what does not exist. Alamar and Glantz 2007 com-
pletely ignore the point, even though I made the point in the section titled, “The 
Forgotten Restaurants.”
My third criticism was that to know the effect of a non-smoking ordinance, 
one would want to study the data in an area before and after the ordinance. In-
stead, as noted above, Alamar and Glantz (2004) do a cross-sectional study at a 
point in time. Not only do Alamar and Glantz (2007) not respond to this criti-
cism, but also they do not even learn from it, as they misstate their own findings. 
They write, “We found a positive effect on this ratio when smokefree laws were 
implemented.” But they did not find that at all, as they admit in Alamar and 
Glantz (2004). They did not look at what happened “when smokefree laws were 
implemented.” That would have been the before-and-after study I called for. In-
stead, as noted, they looked at cross-sectional data.
Finally, there is another empirical problem with the results in Alamar and 
Glantz (2004) that I failed to point out in Henderson (2007). Dunham and Mar-
low (2000) point out that smoking bans on restaurants are more likely to be leg-
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islated in cities where a large percentage of the population already has a strong 
desire for such bans. This desire for bans, no doubt, reflects their own taste for 
restaurants that do not allow smoking. This means that any adverse effect of a 
smoking ban on restaurant revenues in such communities will tend to be low. But 
one cannot generalize from that fact to a conclusion about the effect of smoking 
bans in general. 
Alamar and Glantz may attack Dunham and Marlow (2000) on the grounds 
that it was funded by a tobacco company. In their earlier paper, Alamar and 
Glantz put a great deal of weight on the funding source of various articles in lieu 
of judging the content of those articles. Surely funding by a tobacco company 
should make one approach such a study with more skepticism than otherwise. But 
the funding source alone is not enough to justify disputing its findings without 
giving reasons. Glantz has received much of his funding from the anti-smoking 
lobby and, indeed, from taxes on tobacco. That should make one skeptical of 
his findings. But the skepticism is not enough to warrant rejecting his findings. 
Notice that in no part of Henderson (2007) and in no part of this rejoinder do I 
dispute anything Alamar and Glantz write based on the source of their funds. My 
argument is solely based on logic and evidence, as it should be. To reject any find-
ing on the basis of its funding is to attack the character of the researcher. As any 
elementary logic text will point out, such ad hominem attacks are illegitimate.2  
a cHallenge
As noted above, a major part of the argument in Alamar and Glantz (2004), 
which they repeat in Alamar and Glantz (2007), is that restaurant owners did 
not have access to information about the effects of a smoking ban other than 
the information that tobacco companies provided. Again, they gave no evidence 
for that claim. Let’s assume for a minute, though, that Alamar and Glantz are 
correct that the restaurant owners had no other information. But now they do. 
The California non-smoking law in restaurants has been in effect since January 
1, 1995. That has given us 13 years of experience. So their key argument about 
bad information, if it ever applied, surely does not apply now. There is no good 
case, therefore, even from their viewpoint, for imposing a ban in California today. 
If they are right, then ending the ban will cause no restaurants to start allowing 
smoking. If I am right, at least some will. I call on Alamar and Glantz to put their 
policy prescriptions where their theory is and call for ending the ban. And if they 
refuse to do so, it is fair for the rest of us to ask them, “Do you really believe your 
own imperfect information story or are you being the big bully on the block who 
believes that might makes right and doesn’t care about the minority?” 
2  See, for example, Joseph Gerald Brennan, A Handbook of  Logic, New York: Harper & Row, 1961, p. 
217.
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